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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. BACKGROUND
1.1 The key aspects on which ttie Committee was charged to advise the
Deputy President on were :
• the appropriate and functional relationships that could 
be evolved between government and organs of civil 
society with respect to the provision of capacity for the 
implementation of the RDP;
• the feasibility of an appropriate funding mechanism that 
would enable a co-ordinated approach to the funding of 
civil society organisations, the relationships of such a 
mechanism with current development funding players 
and other transitional mechanisms;
• a mechanism to promote a sustainable partnership 
between these organisations with government.
2. KEY FINDINGS OF THE COMMITTEE
After careful consideration of all pertinent factors, the Committee 
established that :
2. 1 In spite of broad support for the RDP, there is no coordinated 
approach to tackling poverty. Government has been able to attract 
aid and has not found it easy to use such large funding owing to 
processes of change management and the processes of setting up 
local government infrastructures. Concomitant with these issues is 
the lack of management skills at the Government levels.
2. 2 Organs of civil society involved in development work in South Africa 
remain a rich inheritance for the Government of National Unity. 
These institutions, generally referred to as Community Based 
Organisations (CBOs) or Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) 
span a wide variety of the development landscape.
These organs of Civil Society seek to fuel the development agenda 
of South Africa through participation in the RDP, but have often 
found themselves frustrated by the lack of clear policy and 
connecting points with Government in general.
2. 3 Experience from other countries show that the role of CSOs in 
development and the sustenance of democracy is a key feature of
advanced democracies. Foreign research proved that cooperation 
between CSOs and various tiers government has often produced 
positive results. Owing to their affinity, empathy and proximity to the 
broader populace CSOs have always proved to be effective in 
meeting the basic needs of the population they serve.
2. 4 The initial energizing force for development which broadly funded 
the CSO sector has transformed. Local development funding 
institutions have developed a new focus and business approach. 
The Kagiso Trust and the IDT are gearing themselves to operate as 
development implementation institutions as against solely the 
funding of development and the facilitation of funding for 
development initiatives.
2. 5 Foreign aid funding, money which was historically marked for 
CSOs, is largely being directly channeled to Government. This 
source of funding has progressively declined since the 1994 
elections. Indications are that this pattern is likely to continue as 
erstwhile traditional International Aid donors prefer bilateral funding 
arrangements with government. Corporate grant funding which in 
any case has always been limited to the CSO sector will continue to 
flow to corporate programmes and will remain a significant factor to 
this sector.
2. 6 Development CSOs operate within a restrictive environment in 
respect of taxation and registration.
2.7 There is broad and significant support for a positive structural 
relationship and a coordinated funding mechanism between CSOs 
and Government to promote the objectives and principles of the 
RDP.
2.8 The need to establish a channel of communication between CSOs 
and government. Through this mechanism, government and CSOs 
would be able to agree on RDP and development.
3. EXISTING FUNDING MECHANISMS
The committee reviewed the existing funding mechanisms which are 
associated with government namely, IDT, TNDT and government 
departments. It was felt that it would be necessary to make 
adjustments such as that the funding function and the 
implementation function is not carried out by the same body.
The government must enhance its own capacity to fast-tract 
delivery and therefore an instrument such as the IDT needed to be 
transformed to play a different role.
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CSOs that perform specialised functions for particular Government 
Departments continue to get funding from relevant line 
departments.
3.1 TRANSFORMATION OF INDEPENDENT 
DEVELOPMENT TRUST (IDT
The IDT must be transformed into a Government Development 
Agency, that will implement projects which are commissioned by 
government departments. It must cease to be a CSO, an 
independent agency or a funding agency. The IDT should further 
be requested to contribute some of its invested capital towards the 
establishment of an institution which will be dedicated towards the 
funding of CSOs.
Through this adjustment, government will enhance and fast-tract its 
delivery capacity, the Board of the new IDT will be appointed by 
the government (for detail see 8.9 of Report).
3.2 PHASING OUT OF TRANSITIONAL NATIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT TRUST (TNDT)
It is recommended that the TNDT should be phased out and all its 
assets transferred to the new funding mechanism.
(for detail see 8,10 of Report).'
3 3 GOVERNMENT AND LOCAL DEPARTMENTS
The Committee recommends that the funding of CSOs by national 
and provincial government as well as by line departments, be 
maintained. This funding should be given to CSOs that provide 
special services to the given sector.
Assistance should be offered to enable local government, in 
particular those who are located in the most disadvantaged 
communities, to work with local CSO to provide the essential 
services (see 8.11 of Report).
4. KEY RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE
On the basis of information obtained from literature survey, 
opinions expressed by relevant stakeholders, and a rigorous 
analysis of the same, the Committee recommends the
establishment of an institutional mechanism for the funding of 
CSOs by Government
The Committee presents two options, and recommends the 
second option.
4.1 Funding Option One
Disbursement by Ministry of Finance
Establish a funding disbursement unit located in the Ministry of 
Finance to finance CSOs recommended by a joint committee of 
government departments and ministries, together with CSOs. The 
Funding Disbursement Unit will be accountable to the Executive 
Deputy President’s Office. In this option the Executive Deputy 
President's Office will have full responsibility for policy coordination 
and decisions on allocation of funds.
or
4 2 Funding Option Two
Statutory body or National Development Agency (NDA) - 
Recommended
This option proposes the establishment of a funding statutory body 
or National Development Agency (NDA). This institution will be 
located in the office of the Executive Deputy President and will 
report to Parliament It will coordinate policy consultations and 
disperse funding This statutory body will have a governing board 
appointed through public hearings and/or by public nominations. 
This Board should have the latitude and authority to elaborate the 
details of this structure including the appointment of the Chief 
Executive.
The Executive Deputy President’s Office to oversee the work of the 
NDA instead of direct coordination as in option one.
A table providing graphic detail of options is attached.
The NDA Committee submits that the Executive Deputy 
President and Cabinet should seriously consider Option Two, 
as :
• It offers both government and CSOs a critical platform for 
policy discussion and joint propriety/action that will have
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positive impact on the RDP and will lead to involvement of 
various CSOs in the implementation of the RDP.
It offers government a degree of influence while ensuring a 
degree of independence for CSOs. the independence will 
enable the new funding mechanism to broaden the funding 
base beyond government.
It is likely to fast-tract the delivery of development 
programmes as this will be one of its key functions.
It is unlikely to be caught up in the conflict often experienced 
by institutions that act both as implements and funders of 
development activity.
It is unlikely to inherit historical problems, misperceptions 
and animosities faced by the current operating mechanisms 
such as the IDT and the TNDT.
It opts for lessened political involvement at ministerial and 
other levels and provides for a high-level of accountability to 
civil society and potential beneficiaries who will be on the 
centre of decision-making.
It has the potential for a reduced level of bureaucracy and 
ministerial red tape and can be operated at the provincial and 
or local levels.
It does not add burden to the already overstretched office of 
the Executive Deputy President, yet remains accountable to 
an overarching office.
It can be put in place by using current ministerial and 
departmental RDP budget savings, TNDTs non-expenditures 
and savings as well as the possibility of recalling IDT un­
allocated investments.
The NDA should not replace bilateral funding relations 
between CSOs and donors.
It has been widely advocated for by all key stakeholders.
It is informed by successful international experience.
The prospect for success in our context is high.
Its implementation is likely to create the least problems for all 
key stakeholders.
• Similar institutions have found this framework to be most 
enabling e g. Swedish International Development Corporation 
Agency (Sida), Overseas Development Administration (ODA) 
- UK. United States Agency for International Development 
(USAID), Norwegian Aid Development (NORAD).
5. PROPOSED FINANCING OF THE NEW CSO 
FUNDING MECHANISM
• The government
• State Lottery
• donors including the private sector.
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OPTIONS FOR FUNDING OF CSOs
OPTION 1
FUNDINC UNIT WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE
OPTION 2
ESTABLISH A STATUTORY BODY / 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
LOCATION OF A FUNDING 
MECHANISM
•  Establish a CSO Statutory Body in the Ministry of Finance.
•  Stalled bv finance and development personnel. Responsible for allocating 
funds and monitoring grantees.
•  Establish a Statutory Body that eeill coordinate development policy 
formulation and allocate funds to CSO. CSOs and government form the NDA 
to be accountable to the Executive Deputy President. Located in it’s oeen 
premises.
•  NDA monitors and evaluates grantees.
DEVELOPMENT POLICY 
FORMULATION
•  Establish a Development Police Unit at the Executive Depute President’s 
office which will include both government departments and CSO 
representatives.
•  A development policy process is coordinated by the NDA involving both 
government and CSOs, accountable to the Executive Deputy President.
•  Associations/organisations to be funded will be decided by the NDA in 
accordance with agreed development priorities.
•  NDA does not implement
ROLE OF THE TNDT •  TNDT to phase out and hand over assets to the neev Statutory Body. •  TNDT to phase out and hand over assets to NDA.
OPTION 1 OPTION 2
FUNDING UNIT WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE ESTABLISH A STATUTORY BODY / 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
IDT TRANSFORMED TO • II ) I eeases to be independent or an N(iO • IDT ceases to be independent or an NGO
GOVERNMENT
IMPLEMENTING AGENCY • IDT becomes a statutory bode responsible for facilitating and implementing • IDT becomes a statutory bode responsible for facilitating and implementing
government programmes commissioned be departments government programmes commissioned be departments
• 11)1 investments handed over to the Funding Unit Except that which is • IDT investments handed over to the Statutory Bodv/NDA Except that eehich
needed for the new II) 1 is needed for the neve agency.
• Surplus funds also handed over to the Funding Body • Surplus funds also handed over to the Statutory Bode/NDA
• Collaborate w ith local CS( >s and build local capacity'whenever deployed • Accountable to the Executive Deputy President
bv departments
• Funded be Commissioning Departments
• I’aiticipanls in the 1 )e\elopment Police Formulation Unit in the Executive 
Depute President's ( (dices • i o collaborate with local CSOs and build local capacity whenever deployed 
by departments
• Government to appoint Board
• Can be funded be NDA for administration and broad development projects
New IDT will be
• Accountable to the Executive Depute President
• funded be Commissioning Departments • Located preferable in Pretoria
• Evaluated and monitored be commissioning departments • Government to appoint the Board.
• Funded from a Statutory Body/Funding Unit for administration and broad 
development projects e g. capacitc-building in a local authority .
• Located preferable in Pretoria
OPTION 1
FUNDING UNIT WITHIN THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE
OPTION 2
ESTABLISH A STATUTORY BODY / 
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
ROLE OF GOVERNMENT •  To continue to fund their preferred CSOs. •  To continue to fund their preferred CSOs.
DEPARTMENT
NATION AIVPROVINCIAL •  Will be part of policy-making body. •  Will be part of policy-making body
• To monitor and evaluate their grantees. •  To monitor and evaluate their grantees.
•  Funding will be funding will be sensitive to overall development priorities. •  Their funding will be sensitive to overall development priorities
•  To commission the IDT as preferred.
ROLE OF LOCAL •  Local government to fund local CSOs according to determined policy •  Local government and NDA to fund local CSOs according to determined
AUTHORITY, LOCAL CSOs policy and criteria.
ESPECIALLY IN DEPRIVED •  Local CSOs m poor communities to be given propriety by local government
AREAS and the new funding mechanism. •  Local CSO.? in poor communities to be given propriety
•  Enhance capacity of local CSOs to apply for and manage grants. •  Enhance capacity of local CSOs to apply for and manage grants
•  Local government to monitor and evaluate grantees. •  Local goveminent/NDA (where necessary ) to monitor and evaluate grantees
KEY DIFFERENCES
OPTION 1 OPTION 2
•  Establishes a unit within the Department of Finance linked to the Executive Deputy Presidents •  Establishes a Statutory Body being accountable to the Executive Deputy President
office.
•  Both funding and policy are handled by the Institution and accountable to the Executive Depths
• Funding Unit handles funding only, policy is located in the Executive Deputy Presidents office President.
•  All processes are handled bv the Statutory Board
• Screening and decision on grantees is done bv the Policy Unit in the Executive Presidents office.
Statutory Body in the Finance Department is responsible for function and best practice.
CHALLENGE : The need to continuously balance the needs and goals of both parties i.e
DANGER : The two units could become cumbersome and could easily fall into a trap of being government and CSO organisastions
nin as government departments.
STRENGTH : NDA will be managed as a parastatal with all advantages associated with that
I'he mechanism is likelv to be too prescriptive to NGOs
NDA gives a degree of independence.
Unequal levels of competencies amongst different tiers of government and 
ministries would be a major constrain NDA would be less prescriptive while operating within government framework
SIMILARITIES
In both cases :
•  Implementation and funding are separated
•  Government appoints governing boards
•  IDT is transformed into a government implementing agency
•  1 he transtonned IDT takes responsibility for capacity building whenever it implements government programmes
•  Role of Local Authorities as development facilitators and the importance of enhancing local NGOs is emphasised
•  Overall authority is in the office of tf\e Executive Deputy Presidents, in particular, policy formulation
•  National and Provincial governments are enabled and encouraged to support targeted NGOs.
1. PART 1: INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
1.1 In April 1996, the Cabinet passed a resolution to appoint 
members of Civil Society and certain Government Ministers to 
advice the Deputy President on a possible structural 
relationship and/or mechanism that the Government of 
National Unity (GNU), led by the African National Congress 
(ANC) might develop with organisations of Civil Society with 
the view to advancing the principles and objectives of the 
Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP).
1.2 The appointment of this Committee was initially motivated by 
the then Minister without Portfolio - Mr Jay Naidoo. This task 
was subsequently transferred with all other functions of the 
RDP office to the office of the Deputy President.
1.3 The management and co-ordination of the work of the 
Committee was done by Ms Sibongile Mkhabela through the 
NGO liaison office within the Deputy President’s office, 
sponsored by the Private Agencies Collaborating Together 
(PACT) - a United States based Private Voluntary 
Organisation (PVO) with a South African field office based in 
Johannesburg. The objective of PACT is to strengthen the 
capacity of NGOs and CBOs in South Africa as well as to seek 
ways to assist Government structures in achieving the 
objectives and principles of the RDP.
1.4 The Committee was constituted by 17 members. These 
members represent a wide body of knowledge, experience and 
expertise in the field of NGO and CBO development, policy 
formulation, financing of NGOs and CBOs as well as labour 
and business experience. Certain Government departments 
and ministries were also represented in the Committee. Key 
amongst these were the Minister of Public Works, Mr Jeff 
Radebe, and staff person Mr Bongani More - a Director in the 
Department of Public Works, and senior management staff of 
the Welfare Department Mr Graham Block and Ms Sarghoona 
Gordhan, Chief Director and Director of NGO related affairs, 
respectively.
The Committee was chaired by the Deputy Minister of Trade 
and Industry Ms Phumzile Mlambo-Ngcuka. Other Committee 
members brought international experience from the United 
Nations Development Program (UNDP), the Swedish 
International Development Cooperation Agency (Sida) as well 
as the United States Aid for International Development 
(USAID). Committee members’ names are reflected in 
Annexure 2 to this report.
1.5
1.5.1
1.5.2
1 6
1 . 6.1
1 . 6.2
1.6.3
1.6.4
1.6.5
1 . 6.6
The Terms of Reference for the Committee require the 
Committee to advise the Deputy Executive President and the 
Cabinet on :
The appropriate and functional relationships that must 
be developed between members of CSOs with respect 
to the provision of capacity for the implementation of 
the RDP.
The structure and precise functions that must be 
developed to achieve same.
Details of the Terms of Reference for the Committee are 
reflected in Annexure 1 to this report.
The establishment of this Committee to advise the Deputy 
President and Cabinet on the above factors was born out of 
several factors including;
The recognition and appreciation by the Government of 
a rich inheritance of CSOs in South Africa after the 
1994 elections.
The role that CSOs have hitherto played in accelerating 
and sustaining the process of social and economic 
change .
The need to involve the beneficiaries of development in 
development initiatives in order to achieve the 
maximum development impact possible.
The recognition that CSOs often have direct links and 
relationships with community groups which Government 
may not always have. This empathy and proximity of 
CSOs to communities can often assist Government in 
its efforts to alleviate poverty.
Government is determined to enhance partnerships 
between itself and those CSOs involved in 
development. This is in the interest of both Government 
and the general South African population especially the 
disadvantaged.
The need for the rationalisation and re-organisation of 
existing funding delivery mechanisms to create a 
functional and sustainable interface between 
Government and CSOs.
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1.6.7 Previous attempts initiated by the Minister without 
portfolio, Mr Jay Naidoo and the then deputy Finance 
Minister, Mr Alec Erwin to encourage a merger between 
the Industrial Development Trust and the Kagiso Trust
(KT).
1.6.8 The need for a development finance framework made 
up of focused institutions to ensure amongst other 
things, grant funding for the development sector.
1.6.9 The endorsement and subsequent establishment by 
Cabinet in October, 1995 of the Transitional National 
Development Trust to respond to the immediate needs 
of CSOs in the development field1 At the material time, 
Cabinet also resolved to seek ways to create a long­
term institutional arrangement for the future support of 
Civil Society, to be known as the National Development 
Agency (NDA).
1 This was a transitional mechanism set up by the RDP Office and involving participation of 
NEDLAC, the South African NGO Coalition, the CBO Network, the Independent 
Development Trust and Kagiso Trust.
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PART 2: PROCESS AND METHODOLOGIES ENCOUNTERED
BY THE COMMITTEE AND LIMITATIONS
2.1 Process and Methodology
Notwithstanding the fact that the process was initiated in April, 
the Committee only began its operations after final resolution 
to appoint the Committee was passed by Cabinet in July 1996 
the process having been started in April of the same year. In 
its attempts to give the Deputy President and Cabinet the best 
advice possible, the Advisory Committee engaged in several 
processes. These are;
2.1.1 The review of literature on the subject in order to 
develop' an understanding of the latest views and 
notions about the role of CSOs in development. This 
literature review also sought to define in clear terms the 
exact nature of CSOs that are likely to establish or are 
needed to establish a relationship with Government in 
the promotion of sustainable development.
2.1.2 Reconnaissance visits to Sweden with the purpose of 
obtaining first-hand knowledge of experiences of how to 
open democracies, promote partnerships between 
Government and CSOs in carrying out development 
activities. The Committee has also envisaged other 
emerging economies such as visiting India, Kenya and 
Brazil and compare experiences. This intention was not 
accomplished as time and resource constraints limited 
against this possibility. That being the case, the 
Committee had to rely heavily on expert opinion and 
literature surveyed.
2.1.3 Conducting meetings on a one on one basis with 
specific institutions which had a vested interest in the 
outcome of the process. The Mvula Trust, IDT, TNDT, 
National NGO Coalition and the CBO network were 
amongst the key institutions with which discussions 
were held.
2.1.4 Oral and written submissions were also received from a 
wide spectrum of our society. The Ministry of Health, 
Public Works and Welfare were amongst the key 
Government departments that made submissions. Other 
submissions came from NEDLAC, the NGO Coalition, 
individual NGOs, Community Liaison Officers (CLOs), 
the IDT and the TNDT. International bodies particularly 
those within the UN system such as the UNDP, the 
UNICEF and UNFPA, the European Union and other
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donors also made oral submissions. A listing of all 
written submissions is attached - see Annexure 3.
2.1.5 Consultative workshops in all the Provinces were 
conducted with various CSOs as key stakeholders in 
this process.
2.1.6 The Committee also held regular meetings and working 
sessions to review, consolidate and determine 
direction.
2.1.7 Various briefs, consultations and correspondence was 
held with NEDLAC Development Chamber in order to 
keep them informed of the progress of the Committee 
and encourage the Chamber to make input in the 
process.
2.1.8 The workshops, reconnaissance visits, and literature 
review were graciously and generously sponsored by 
the UNDP, SIDA, and the Liberty Life Foundation.
2.2 Limitations
The Advisory Committee encountered a number of limitations 
in the performance of its functions. These can be articulated 
as;
2.2.1 The long and protracted process of approving the 
Committee by Cabinet. This has effectively shortened 
the initial time-frames contemplated by the Committee 
to undertake the task. Instead of the 8 months i.e. April 
to December, the Committee had to operate from July 
and finish its work by December 1996.
2.2.2 The state tender procedures for the procurement of 
consultant services seriously delayed the 
implementation of provincial workshops. These 
workshops were considered critical by the Committee 
as they would help shape the outcome of the inquiry 
given the fact that the envisaged respondents were a 
reservoir of essential information. Secondly, ignoring 
these constituencies would render the whole 
investigation illegitimate.
2.2.3 Deadlines and budgeting constraints led to restricted 
access to relevant players from other countries, 
particularly those in emerging economies which may 
have enriched the experience of the Committee thereby
5
2.2.4
improving the quality of advise to the Deputy President 
and Cabinet.
In spite of these limitations, the Committee attempted to 
be as extensive as was possible in exploring the scope 
and complexity of the task it was charged with. 
Needless to say, these limitations do not invalidate the 
opinions submitted in this report.
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PART 3: THE SCOPE AND SCALE OF THE DEVELOPMENT
PROBLEM IN SOUTH AFRICA
3.1 South Africa’s new government inherited enormous social 
challenges generally experienced by most developing 
countries. These challenges include inter alia,
3.1.3 the imperative to build strong economies —
characterized by quality jobs as well as national and 
household productivity that would improve incomes and 
generate resources for economic and social investment;
3.1.2 the task of attracting and building investment 
infrastructure for economic development thereby 
improving the quality of life of all its populations;
3.1.3 developing strategies to address large scale 
urbanization, coupled with intensifying poverty, as well 
as extreme lack of services and a poor quality of life in 
rural areas;
3.1.4 and recently, the daunting challenges posed by the 
ever-expanding HIV and AIDS crisis and the 
intensifying environmental problems.
3.1.5 According to the UNDP’s “Human Development Report 
1996”, in most developing countries poverty is 
increasing. In the developing world, 1 person in 3 lives 
in poverty and 1 billion people go without basic social 
services such as health care, safe drinking water and 
adequate nutrition.
3.2 South Africa’s problem of poverty and social deprivation is 
fundamentally shaped by the experience and legacy of 
apartheid and the systematic racial discrimination of old. 
Thus, while according to the UNDP’s categorization, South 
Africa is a middle-income country with a human development 
index rating better than 79 other countries, its black 
population rating is however equivalent to that of Congo (52 
from the bottom of the table), while the white population is 
equivalent to that of Canada (with the best human 
development rating)'2
3.3 The country faces huge backlogs in educational provision, 
housing, health, water and sanitation. The Reconstruction and 
Development Programme Base Document (1994) described
2 See October Household Survey, April 1995, conducted by Community Agency for social 
inquiry under the auspices of the RDP.
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poverty as the ‘single greatest burden of South Africa’s 
people’. The programme identified ‘meeting basic needs’ and 
'developing human resources’ as the most important 
development objectives of the country. It argued that 17 
million people live in poverty, with 11 million of these based in 
rural areas. The housing backlog was estimated at 1,3 million 
and set to rise. More than 12 million people lacked safe 
drinking water and 21 million people lacked adequate 
sanitation. Approximately 5 million people have no education 
at all).3
3.4 The end of apartheid and the installation of a democratic 
government meant the use of state power to mobilize 
resources for new priorities — including tackling poverty and 
eradicating apartheid. Of course, such strategic possibilities in 
themselves fueled expectations of quick solutions to poverty 
and of the immediate improvements to standards of living.
3.5 Although government has been able to redirect resources 
through an RDP fund and through accessing bilateral aid, 
resources remain constrained. It has been calculated that the 
country needs approximately R60 billion to erase urban 
development backlogs and in the region of R30 billion for rural 
development. The problem of insufficient resources is further 
exacerbated by:
3.5.1 the “governments” macro-economic goals to reduce its 
deficit from 5.8 to 3 percent and the consequent public 
expenditure cuts that may be required,
3.5.2 the overhang of internal debt generated in the last 
years of apartheid that absorbs some 18% of revenues 
in the form of debt servicing;
3.5.3 the cost of financing the “sunset clause” which protects 
for a prescribed period of time, the tenure of 
bureaucrats inherited from the old order.
3.5.4 ongoing financial viability problems at local government 
level where the culture of non-payment for services 
weakens strategies for mobilizing revenue for the 
provision and extension of infrastructure.
3.6 Ironically, government has found it extremely difficult to spend 
resources released for development purposes. Despite 
modest increases in expenditure for housing, land reform,
3 For confirmation of these figures, see du Toit. JB and Falkena HB. 1994. The Structure of
the South African Economy, Halfvvav House : Southern Book Publishers.
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education and health, huge chunks of development funds 
have had to be rolled-over from one year to the next. For 
example less than 21 percent of the 1995/6 budget for 
housing was spent and R2 billion of RDP funds for the same 
year was rolled-over to the next year. Rollovers amounted to 
R8 billion in the 1996/7 financial year4.
3.7 Government has also found it difficult to organise itself in such 
a way as to efficiently utilize foreign funding, made available 
from the European Union and other donors. This shortcoming 
was linked to :
3.7.1 a shortage of personnel skilled in development planning 
and government project management;
3.7.2 delays in local government elections and in the 
installation of legitimate non-racial local governments; 
and the lack of institutional capacity; at local 
government level;
3.7.3 problems of institutional clarity and capacity in 
provinces.
3.8 The development scene in South Africa also suffers from 
inadequate overall co-ordination. Although the framework of 
the Reconstruction and Development Programme is generally 
uncontested as a national vision and enjoys support, our 
country continues to suffer from lack of a co-ordinated 
strategy to combat poverty.
3.9 Where steps are taken in the sector to address the legacy of 
apartheid, it often unfolds in ways that are unrelated to 
dev'elopments in other sectors and which sometimes conflict. 
The various players in development, each with their own 
particular thrusts and priorities, include:
3.9.1 government and its various departments, many of them 
are the in processes of transforming themselves and 
preoccupied with the important task of formulating 
policy guidelines;
3.9.2 parastatals, many of which are also experiencing 
change, but still managing key resources for 
infrastructure and research;
4 Interfund, 1996. Development Update : An Intefund briefing on development and the 
voluntary sector in South Africa in 1995/96. Johannesburg Interfund.
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3.9.3 the private sector, challenged by increasing global 
competitiveness as well as internal transformation 
issues affirmative action, employment creation, 
involvement in physical development projects, 
restructuring of ownership and its role in NEDLAC,
3.9.4 the voluntary sector, with its expectations of 
partnerships with the state largely going unmet, but 
continuing to deliver necessary services, very often to 
the poorest and most neglected sectors of society; and 
doing this with very little resources.
3.10 Civil Society Organisations have, in the years of transition, 
experienced immense turbulence and change. They have 
suffered the loss of top and middle leadership to various 
institutions of the state. They have seen anti-apartheid 
funding to themselves transformed into bilateral aid destined 
to be managed by government departments. Many have 
closed down and, in many cases, vital development capacity 
has been eroded. As a sector, CSOs have failed to respond 
adequately. Weakened by losses and by the difficulties 
involved in managing a large and diverse sector, they have 
struggled to develop strategies and a coherent voice to assert 
their role in development. Frequently they have found 
themselves frustrated by the lack of clear connecting points 
with government, and by ambiguous and differing government 
responses to their work and plight.
3.11 Given that, the development need is so great that the 
government cannot answer it alone, there is a clear need to 
harness the energies and resources of NGOs/CBOs. In 
general NGOs/CBOs play a role not instead of government, 
nor in merely helping government cope with pressures of 
transition; rather, they are partners, without whom — in all 
developing countries, social problems are difficult to 
overcome.5 More specifically, NGOs are, by virtue of their 
aims and values, the sector most closely aligned to the 
objectives of the RDP and to any programme set up to 
address poverty.
3.12 The Committee found that NGOs and CBOs, together with the 
community initiative that they foster and that sustains them, 
are indispensable to effectively promote sustainable 
development. It is widely believed that a champion is now 
needed to facilitate an engagement between government’s 
development programme, NGOs and CBOs. Such a champion,
5 See : The Commonwealth Foundation 1995. Non-Govemment Organisations : Gudielines
for Good Policy and Practice. (Prepared by Colin Ball & Leith Dunn) London :
Commonwealth countries, demonstrates this point.
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many argue, needs to be an institution which handles the 
common concerns between government and civil society about 
development, as well as harness resources and co-ordinate 
strategies of both sectors to maximize effectiveness in 
meeting development needs.
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PART 4. THE SCALE AND DIMENSIONS OF CIVIL
SOCIETY ORGANISATIONS IN SOUTH AFRICA
4.1 Size of the Sector: Figures referring to the size of the sector
should be approached with caution. Estimates are widely 
divergent. The Development Resources Center puts the 
figure at 54 000 while the Independent Media Services of 
South Africa punts for the figure of 30 000. This is partly as a 
result generally of the problem of lack of reliable information 
about this sector. Obtaining statistics and keeping them up to 
date is a challenge in all developing countries with numerous 
competing claims for resources and effort. The
inconsistencies in estimates also influenced by the different 
definitions ascribed to different types of CSOs. The former 
figure probably includes CSOs such as stockvels and school 
committees, while the latter figure only refers to organisations 
which exist for the promotion of development for communities 
other than members of associations, for welfare or for 
charitable purposes. What may be said without contradiction 
is that the sector is enormous. In every part of the country and 
in every community CSOs exist in one form or another.
4.2 Diversity is a Strength : As outlined by the Commonwealth
Foundation Report6 the development landscape is
characterized by a rich diversity of civil society organisations. 
They range from highly sophisticated information-driven 
initiatives that provide specialist services, to community-based 
(informal) initiatives that seek to pro-actively provide 
rudimentary employment, or social services to deprived 
communities. In broad terms, it coincides with the spectrum of 
organisations - ranging from care and welfare, to change and 
development. This diversity requires a nuanced and 
variegated policy framework to ensure that formalisation 
enhances rather than impede their effectiveness. This 
diversity is part of the vibrancy in broader society that is vital 
to the deepening and sustaining of democratic processes.
4.3 Complementarity of NGOs and CBOs : Some opinion- 
makers like to draw a solid line between NGOs and CBOs. 
Although many organisations identify themselves as either
6 Community based organisations (CBOs). denote membership-based organisations esablished 
to represent a particular interest group or locality (or organisations established to represent a 
particular interest group or locality or conglomeration of interest groups and/or localities); 
and Non-Government Organisations (NGOs) refer to service-delivery organisations comprised 
or (professionally) trained staff that perform dedicated functions to achieve the specific 
purpose of the given organisations. These are distinctively non-membership and therefore 
make interventions on the basis of principles, values, objectives etc., as opposed to their 
representative status.
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one or the other, it is difficult to create neat pigeonholes for 
each. No characteristics are exclusively attributable to the 
one category to the complete exclusion of the other; be it in 
terms of accountability to communities, relationship with 
donors, or the notion of a service delivery role. In addition, 
particular roles - for example, training, lobbying or helping 
communities to organise basic services, are usually filled by 
both CBOs and NGOs. In this context it makes better sense, it 
is argued, to move beyond the dichotomous understanding of 
membership-based organisations on the one hand and 
professional agencies on the other, typified as CBOs and 
NGOs respectively in South African terminology.7
It is argued that for the purpose of a structural relationship 
and support of this sector it may be more prudent to speak in 
terms of a spectrum of civil society development 
organisations. This approach will assist the development of 
the relationship between government and CSOs to rather base 
its policies on an analysis of the different roles that these 
different institutions play in the development process. These 
roles and the functions they fulfill, add value to the overall 
empowerment process in different but complementary ways. 
The tired debate about who is primary and who is secondary 
between CBOs and NGOs detracts from an ability to identify 
capacity in a comprehensive way relative to developmental 
roles that each type of organisation plays.
4.4 Consequently, an emerging structural institution between 
CSOs and Government will be to provide appropriate support 
to all CSOs along the spectrum of development initiatives. 
Organisations should be assessed on the basis of whether 
they are making an effective contribution to development or 
not. This should constitute part of understanding diversity - 
the potential offered and constraints faced by CSOs.
4.5 Legal Categories : A legalistic breakdown of the sector 
indicates four categories:
4.5.1 voluntary associations (established as a product of 
common law, small and informal community initiatives), 
which tend to be membership based;
4.5.2 trusts (created under statute and residual common law, 
including purposes for gain);
7 Rapoo, Thabo and Shubane, Khehla 1996. Govemment/CSO Relations : International and 
Southern African Experiences : Page 9.
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4.5.3 section 21 companies (public companies limited by 
guarantee, with a minimum of seven members), which 
tend to be service-providing and non-membership 
based NGOs;
4.5.4 other specific legislated organisational forms such as 
trade unions which fall under the Labor Relations Act 
and other associations which can be grouped under the 
Friendly Societies Act.
4.6 Other Categorization : NGOs and CBOs are as diverse as 
the categorization of development problems and the many 
kinds of development interventions there are. Even within 
sectoral categories such as education, health and capacity 
building, they meet different needs. Some define themselves 
as trainers, lobbyists, providers of resources, community 
development animators and so on. Others see themselves as 
a combination of various categories. In addition, even 
organisations with similar aims use different fund-raising 
approaches and exist in a multiplicity of shapes and sizes.
This, taken together with the different legal forms, serves to 
underscore the importance of ensuring that any interlocutor 
mechanism(s) between government and civil society 
organisations must be sensitive to diversity if it is to harness 
the potential contribution of civil society towards national 
development objectives.
4.7 CSO Impact: Due to the imprecise information on the number 
of NGOs and CBOs and their range of activities, the impact 
and scale of civil society organisations is difficult to measure. 
This uncertainty about figures points to a critical need for 
systematically building capacity and expertise to begin to 
foster a more accurate understanding of these issues. 
Nevertheless, signs point to a sizable NGO and CBO 
contribution to development and to fostering democratic 
processes in South Africa.
These organisations deliver on a major scale in spheres 
where the state is presently weak such as pre-school 
education and literacy, as well as where the state has 
identified a partnership as the most efficient way to tackle the 
scale of need, for example, rural water provision. NGOs have 
also proved themselves indispensable for mobilizing the 
public and marginal groups to participate in democratic 
processes. They have proven important for voter education 
and to the processes of drawing up the new National 
Constitution.
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4.8
4.8.1
4.8.2
4.8.3
4.9
4.9.1
4.9.2
CSO Sector and Quality Control : Acknowledging the 
development input of the CSOs should not cause us to turn a 
blind eye to their problems. As much as the sector has 
strengths, it also has weaknesses and challenges. As with the 
public and private sector, some organisations within the 
development sector are less effective, while others are at the 
cutting edge. However, the quality of CSOs is effectively 
regulated internally, that is, within the sector. CSOs are 
exposed to competition for resources and support. They have 
to give an account to their partners for use of funds, and to 
their constituencies for how they work. They are subject to 
scrutiny of the media, and their fund raising ability can be 
destroyed if they are found to have abused funds. To the 
extent that they remain relevant, utilize funds properly and 
meet needs, NGOs and CBOs live or thrive; otherwise they 
wither and die. Under normal conditions, this weeding-out 
process is healthy, strengthening and constantly improving the 
sector. Of course this natural selection approach needs to be 
qualified in several ways.
First, the present high attrition rate due to the funding 
crisis is a distortion of this process, and is responsible 
for the unacceptably high loss of vital development 
resources.
Second, “normal conditions” for a vibrant and healthy 
sector implies a basically supportive environment, so 
that effective organisations feel valued rather than 
stifled.
Third, imperatives of affirmative action require that 
marginalised groups should not continue to be excluded 
in favour of groups that have previously had more 
access to resources, training and funds.
Taxation and Registration
Significant work has been conducted on the issues of 
tax policy, as it affects NGOs. A view expressed 
constantly by NGO lobbying bodies, is that the 
legislative and tax framework for NGOs remained 
unchanged from the demise of the apartheid era.
In particular, while NGOs are regulated by laws which 
are, on the face of it, 'politically neutral’, these laws 
created instruments used by the apartheid government
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to control civil society initiatives8. The tax law defines 
which organisations should be tax exempt and which 
donating organisations are eligible for tax rebates. In 
present tax law, organisations which fit narrow 
definitions of welfare qualify for tax exemptions. Tax 
breaks are only granted to donors who contribute to 
religious and charitable organisations and those 
involved in formal education. It is not difficult to see 
how these measures were used for control in the 
apartheid context. Ironically, these measures persist 
and are presently being applied in very much the same 
way. This essentially means that there is a need for 
new forms of registration and above all for taxation that 
encourage the rapid development CSOs.
4.9.3 Furthermore, South African law providing for the
registration of NGOs is unnecessarily complex and 
subject to a lengthy bureaucratic procedures9. Lodging 
documents and communicating with the Registrar’s 
office involves such difficulties for the lay-person that 
specialist legal assistance is required. Such assistance 
in turn can be extremely costly to grassroots CSOs.
x Emdon E., Mgoqi W.. and Rosenthal R 1993. Establishment registration and administration 
of NGOs. Report Commission bv the Independent Study into an enabling environment for
NGOs.
9 Interfund. 1996. Development Update : An Interfund briefing on development and the 
voluntary sector in South Africa in 1995/96. Johannesburg. Interfund.
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PART 5: THE SIZE AND SCALE OF FUNDERS
OF CSOs IN SOUTH AFRICA
5.1 South Africa was characterized by an unusually vibrant 
development-funding environment compared to other 
developing countries. This is in part a result of the unique 
legacy of the apartheid system that dominated the lives of the 
majority of poor citizens. To compensate for the systematic 
under-development of the majority black population, a number 
of European and other donors devised innovative strategies 
during the 1980s to channel resources and financial 
assistance to anti-apartheid organisations and also to nascent 
developmental organisations.
5.2 Dedicated organisations were established to act as channels 
for these funds, of which the Kagiso Trust (KT), the South 
African Council of Churches (SACC)and the South African 
Catholic Bishops Conference (SACBC) are the most known. 
European Union funding, which required approval of projects 
in Brussels, as well as from European project partners, 
created major problems for the Kagiso Trust the SACC and 
the SACBC. Their work was beset with huge delays in project 
approval and funding flows, generating resentment and 
charges of inefficiency. In addition, the change to 
government-to-government funding — which meant the end of 
EU funding for these structures — had major implications for 
their beneficiary organisations particularly those of KT. Even 
though KT launched processes to manage the process, 
withdrawal of funding caused crisis and trauma that soured 
relations between KT and former project holders.
5.3 At the same time, the apartheid government made a policy 
shift, as part of their broader security strategy, to win the 
hearts and minds of the black population through selective 
and piecemeal social service upgrading programmes. These 
were implemented via the ‘illegitimate’ Bantustan authorities 
and also the Black Local Authorities and Management 
Committees to build up the legitimacy of these institutions. 
This strategy met with limited success and gave rise to the 
need for something more substantial and ‘politically neutral’.
This reality lead to the inception of the Independent 
Development Trust (IDT)10. Its purpose was to address the 
development backlogs created by the official denial of 
significant development resources to black communities.
10 See Shubane, Khehla. 1996. Report on Selected Development Funders for the Advisory 
Commission on a proposed National Development Agency.
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However, the IDT was born in to a highly politicized era of the 
early 1990s and had to face skepticism and lingering 
credibility problems, especially from NGOs and organised 
CBOs who identified themselves as part of the Mass 
Democratic Movement.
5.4 The legacies of the IDT, SACC, SACBC and KT obviously 
structured the development funding terrain in a fundamental 
manner. NGOs and CBOs interacted in very different ways 
with these institutions. Part of the post-1994 development 
challenge has been to recognize, understand and transcend 
these legacies against a backdrop of limited resources, 
growing needs and rising expectations. This challenge is 
central to the decision to establish a credible national 
institution that is dedicated to a development funding role. It 
underlines the importance of creating a clean slate, as it were, 
to avoid continuities with the past that could re-emerge as 
complications in a new institution, even if only at the level of 
perception.
5.5 Various other development agencies, also with a national 
remit and an interlocutor role for development work, exist, 
such as the Mvula Trust and the Joint Education Trust. 
Significantly - in the context of this report - these 
organisations are not funders as such but development 
agents, directly involved in implementation. Furthermore, they 
usually operate sectorally, sometimes acting as umbrella 
bodies for initiatives in a particular sector. Interestingly, both 
IDT and Kagiso Trust have repositioned themselves so that 
they fit within this category; both are winding down their 
funding role in favour of development facilitation and 
implementation respectively.
5.6 South Africa is also endowed with a diverse number of foreign 
donors. There are government-to-government donors who 
also make grants to NGOs such as, the European Union and 
US AID at one level and individual governments at another.
There is also a range of smaller funders, some of these are 
themselves NGOs (such as Oxfam), while others are 
philanthropic-linked foundations such as the Ford, Kellog and 
Kaiser Family Foundations.
5.7 Foreign funding is subject to policy changes in donor 
countries and is set to decline at the end of the transition 
period (taken to be five years from April 1994). Presently the 
foreign funding for CSOs (direct to CSOs government funding 
earmarked for CSO work) remains at about R700 M. Funding 
problems to CSOs have been caused by the shifts, the
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changed priorities as well as the bottle necking of donor funds 
within government bureaucracy.
5.8 South Africa also has a robust local corporate social 
responsibility and investment sector that has, especially in 
the first year following the democratic elections, signaled an 
intention to work in support of the RDP. Local corporate 
donors vary from those whose grants total more than R1m to 
smaller players, whose level of giving falls under R200 000 
per annum. The overall level of corporate giving looks sizable 
- estimated at R1b. However, such funding is presently of 
limited relevance to CSOs in development.
Most of local private sector money, approximately 60% is 
devoted to “own” or company programmes benefiting 
employees and company selected communities. The 
remainder is spent mainly on educational projects. Only about 
16% of corporate funding goes to development CSOs. Figure 
1 hereunder indicates the estimated levels of funding to 
various CSOs in 199611.
Allocations made towards development funding 
(estimated annual figure)____________________
Corporate sector R 1 b
Foreign funding to CSOs (via government and direct) R 700 M
Independent Development Trust R 351 m
Kagiso Trust R 250 m
Transitional National Development Trust (so far) R 16,5m
Fig 1
11 Because accurate and up-to-date data is not available, these figures are used in a qualified 
way. They must not be regarded as anything more than giving a broad picture of relative 
volumes of funding. The amounts shown for the local corporate and direct overseas sectors are 
based on studies and estimates by the Development Resource Centre of 1993. The amounts for 
the local development institutions must be viewed as estimates because their funding levels 
change and their figures for 1996 are not yet available. The latter information is also drawn 
substanitally from informaiton provided by these bodies.
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PART 6. INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE OF RELATIONSHIPS 
BETWEEN GOVERNMENT AND CSOs
6.1 The Committee has made every effort to learn from the 
experiences of other countries to inform and deepen the 
scope of their work. Pursuant to this objective, the Committee 
studied reports of research work undertaken inter alia by 
bodies such as :
i) the Overseas Development Council, which recently held 
a conference on Strengthening Civil Society’s 
Contribution to Development;
ii) John Hopkins University which launched a major 
empirical examination of the scope, structure, financing 
and role of the private, non-profit sector in 12 major 
countries using a common framework and approach; 
and
iii) The Commonwealth Foundation which developed over 
four years, guidelines for good policy and practice in 
structuring relations between CSOs and government.
Support for civil society and its relationship with government is 
not an issue restricted to one part of the world, or to one set of 
socio-economic circumstances. Non-profit organisations have 
been called on recently to substitute for government social 
welfare spending in the two developed countries and to heip 
overcome the exclusion of the poor in France, to promote 
pluralism in Sweden, and to help foster a civil society in 
Russia and Central Europe.
The Committee paid particular focus in its investigations on 
India, the Philippines, Kenya and Sweden. In the case of 
Sweden, the Committee sent a small delegation to study 
government/CSO relations more closely.
Models studied by the Committee revealed the following 
salient features :
6.2 Philippines
6.2.1 In the case of the Philippines, after the democratization
process of 1985 there was a deliberate attempt to 
provide significant space and opportunity for NGOs and 
CBOs to become involved with government in 
addressing the acute development needs in the country. 
In fact, the role and status of voluntary organisations
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was entrenched in the new constitution of 1986. The 
state actively encourages the formation and operation 
of NGOs and CBOs who worked in the interest of 
national welfare of the citizenry.
It was against this backdrop that a number of legislative 
enactments were promulgated to give practical 
expression to a constitutional commitment to the 
promotion of a government/CSO partnership in pursuit 
of development12. Since this shift in approach to 
voluntary organisations started, a number of valuable 
experiences have been gained.
6.2.2 In response to what the Constitution and Subordinate 
Legislation demanded of them, different line 
departments developed interfacing mechanisms that 
suited their particular needs, e.g., consultative 
mechanisms between government and CSOs on an ad 
hoc or institutionalized basis; in-house liaison offices or 
desks to specifically liaise with CSOs; special financial 
assistance packages directed at CSOs, amongst other 
strategies.
6.2.3 Secondly, most departments only focused on their line 
function and did not necessarily liaise with other 
departments about their interactive approaches to 
CSOs. The Philippines has not yet develop a single 
over-arching mechanism to rationalize and cross- 
fertilize the experiences of different line-departments. 
There remains continued discussions about the 
necessity of getting line ministries to share experiences 
on their respective work with CSOs.
6.3 India
6.3.1 The Indian experience is similar in this regard. Since
the early 1980’s, the role of CSOs has always been 
recognized and encouraged by government. In fact, the 
original purpose of government-initiated agencies was 
to promote the voluntary sector in order to effect
12 See Quizon, Antonio. ‘A Survey of Government Policies and Programmes on Non- 
Government Organisations in the Philippines’ . Original source title not available. This article 
provides a useful survey of the different approaches and mechanisms that were persuaded by 
different line ministries and other dedicated government institutions.
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consultative mechanisms between government and the 
CSOs13.
6.3.2 Government development plans subsequently made 
reference to the role of the voluntary sector, and there 
was clear recognition that it was needed to complement 
government efforts in service delivery, especially to 
reach those who would have been otherwise excluded.
6.2.3 As in the Philippines, no concerted effort was made to 
rationalize the interaction between Government and 
CSOs.
6.4 Kenya
6.4.1 The Kenyan experience has been somewhat different. 
This country enacted a number of laws during the 
1990s to govern and regulate the work of CSOs, 
especially NGOs. The thrust of the Kenyan 
government’s approach is that it seeks to harness the 
service delivery role of NGOs in particular, but within a 
highly circumscribed and over-regulated environment.
An illustrative case in point is the government initiated 
legislation that which sanction the compulsory 
registration of NGOs with the Co-ordinating Board, an 
institution set up to monitor and control NGO activities. 
Another is the legislative instrument called the NGOs 
Code of Conduct of 1995 which seeks to define a code 
of conduct for NGOs and also establish a regulatory 
committee to monitor compliance 14.
6.4.2 It is not difficult to discern that the Kenyan experience 
reveals a situation of a paranoiac government which, 
while recognizing the role of NGOs providing services, 
feels threatens by the advocacy role which NGOs also 
have to fulfill in order to promote democratic practices14
6.5 Sweden
13 See ; Khanna, Shri. 1990. ‘NGO-Government Cooperation in India’, presented at workshop 
organised by Commonwealth Secretariat in India. This article provides a useful historical 
overview of the institutional evolution of NGO-Government interaction in India.
14 Lukalo. IN 1996. NGO-Government Relations in Kenya’. An overview of the process of 
collaboration between NGOs and the Government in Kenys. Paper presented at 
Commonwealth regional workshop for Eastern and Southern Africa. Johannesburg 20-24 May 
1996.
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6.5.1 In Sweden, there is a robust and expansive voluntary 
sector, with a high number of membership-based 
organisations. The Swedish government also 
recognises this as a resource, and dedicates 
considerable energy to encouraging it.
6.5.2 It also supports organisations that may be critical of its 
own policies because of its commitment to participatory 
democracy. This serves to improve and enhance the 
policy framework and programmes of the government. 
In this sense, it differs from both the Philippines and 
India, where respective governments have been 
reluctant to support organisations with programmes 
deemed to be repugnant to ‘national interest’, that is, 
critical of the government.
6.5.3 CSOs in Sweden are given direct input into government 
policy formulation at a very high level. Each line 
department has a specific mandate and puts in place a 
statutory board which is representative of both civil 
society and government. Its main purpose is to develop 
policies and interact with service providers. This model 
provides access and input to civil society, but it also 
blunts those divides between government departments 
which so detract from development.
6.5.4 Having observed and studied international experience 
and interacted with various sectors of our society, we 
have discerned a misguided prevailing conviction that 
the non-profit sector, which make so much of the 
national fabric, consists of consumers and recipients of 
alms who do not actively contribute to the economy. As 
a matter of fact, the non-profit sector now constitutes a 
powerful economic force in Germany, Japan, and the 
United States.
6.5.5 Can the same, in future be true of South Africa? What 
can be said is that world-wide, a broad-based 
understanding of the role and character of civil society 
remains the exception rather than the rule, and in many 
places, the CSOs face a significant problem of lack of 
visibility. That was not the case in South Africa until 
recently, when funder-withdrawal and CSO collapse 
began to take their toll.
6.5.6 In some countries, the lack of awareness of the 
contribution to society made by CSOs is caused by the 
legal limbo in which many organisations are forced to 
operate. Elsewhere in this report we argue for the
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creation of a supportive and enabling legal environment 
for CSOs. This is not in any way to lend weight to those 
who think ‘control’ when they think of govemment/civil 
society relations. In too many countries, tension exists 
between the state and the non-profit sector. 
Sometimes, this tension is inevitable and necessarily 
so; but exclusive emphasis on conflict in the 
relationship at the expense of cooperation can lead to 
the loss of value which both the public and CSO section 
add to the development process of the people of our 
country.
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PART 7 : KEY FINDINGS AND PROPOSALS 
FROM SUBMISSIONS
Based on the submissions received by the Committee, the analysis 
of the workshop results, literature surveys as well as the 
reconnaissance visits made by the Committee, the following issues 
can be noted:
7.1 International Experience
International experience suggest that;
7.1.1 The non-profit sector constitutes a powerful economic 
force in developed economies such as the USA, 
Germany and Japan. In emerging economics the role of 
CSOs is proving to be a rising concern. Legislative 
impediments such as those in Kenya and to some 
extent in South Africa constraint the possibilities for the 
sector to flourish.
7.1.2 CSOs remain a strong force in the sustenance, 
promotion and operation of democracy, the 
strengthening of a human rights culture and to a large 
extent the efficient and effective delivery of 
development initiatives, particularly the eradication of 
poverty.
7.1.3 A supportive legal environment with simple procedures 
for the establishment and operation of CSOs is 
necessary to advance mutually beneficial relationships 
between CSOs and Government.
7.1.4 While retaining their significant policy autonomy line 
ministries achieve more when they work closely with 
NGOs in carrying out the mission to structure and 
service their interactions, with CSOs that work within 
their ambit.
7.1.5 There is a definite need for a signpost government
funded institution to provide a co-ordinative service, 
promote consistency in Government/CSO interactions, 
and to proactively support CSOs that may not be in a 
position to access line department resources and 
programmes.
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7.1.6 Government and CSO relations need to be constantly 
reviewed and the underlying guiding policy framework 
needs to be cautiously referred to, to facilitate maximum 
synergy between government and CSO efforts.
7.1.7 In the US, Sweden and other developed countries 
Government contributes more than 80% of the 
operating and project budgets of CSOs.
7.2 The South African Experience
The provincial workshops and submissions extracted from 
South African organisations and players indicated and 
proposed that;
7.2.1 The CSO sector is vital in the effective implementation 
of development and the sustenance of a Human Rights 
culture in SA
7.2.2 Since the 1994 elections the sector is facing a crisis. 
This crisis is occasioned primarily by the lack of funding 
and the constraining policy environment in which the 
sector operates particularly the current tax laws and 
registration procedures.
7.2.3 In spite of its importance in development, the CSO 
sector does not have a strong profile and its efforts 
generally go unsupported and unrecognized. A major 
effort is required to build a respectful, tolerant and 
trusting network of relationships between the 
government and civil society organisations. What 
needs to be addressed at minimum, is the need for a 
simple, clear and consistent policy framework; enabling 
legislative mechanisms; institutionalized interaction 
between the sectors, and the interlocutor or clearing 
house function that acts as a policy-nerve-center for 
government/civil society interaction.
7.2.4 CSOs which define their work as sectoral have been the 
most keen and quickest to explore contracting with 
government departments. However, other organisations 
that play cross-cutting roles such as, those skilled in 
public participation, human resource development or 
community development are also pursuing the 
contracting option. CSOs see contracting as a source 
of funding for types of work they are already doing, or 
for kinds of activities they have been undertaking but 
are increasingly unable to secure funding for. Sectoral
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7.2.5
7.2.6
7.2.7
7.2.8
organisations such as those in health and education 
have targeted contract work offered by line departments 
of the national government. Service organisations have 
also sought out contracts from provincial government as 
well as local government.
The experience of CSOs in the process of procuring 
contracts has been mixed - a new source of funds and 
exciting new opportunity for some, but frustrating for 
many others. Most CSOs find the procedures involved 
in contracting, especially the tendering aspect,
confusing, complicated and drawn out.
Indications are that only a small proportion of CSOs, 
those most sophisticated and already well funded 
enough to attract better expertise, are able to secure 
government contract work. The rest lack the 
confidence, the resources and the skill to meet the 
requirements and the challenge of the contracting 
game.
Tendering procedures, in particular, have proven an 
insurmountable challenge to smaller service
organisations-ions. CSOs find the requirements of such 
procedures unclear; a situation made worse because 
bureaucrats and tender boards are inconsistent in their 
interpretations of the tendering requirements. By and 
large, no assistance is given or available to equip 
CSOs to tender effectively.
Tendering procedures have been widely criticized and 
processes of reform are underway. Much of the critique 
has revolved around the advantage that large firms 
have over smaller ones in the tendering process. 
Government has set up the Procurement Reform Task 
Team which is drafting the Green Paper on state 
tendering procedures. Proposals for reform, in line with 
early RDP policy statements, focus on simplified tender 
forms and making available to emergent entrepreneurs 
training and assistance with regard to negotiating 
tender procedures. It is imperative that such changes to 
the tendering process take into account the needs of 
small service organisations in the non-profit sector.
The Advisory Committee believes that CSOs should 
have the freedom to contract with government 
departments. In fact, they should be supported and 
assisted in using their expertise through contracting. In 
developmental terms, however, the role of CSOs in
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development cannot be fully realized through 
contracting. If NGOs and CBOs restrict themselves to 
contracting, they limit the role they can play in other 
development work and may, consequently, detract from 
the wider value they can add to the development 
process. Consequently, contracting cannot be the 
primary source of funding for NGO work. Other forms of 
funding - which enable NGOs to exercise their tradit­
ional advantage of creativity, flexibility, innovation and 
responsiveness to community initiative - need to take 
precedence.
There is a need to strengthen partnerships between 
Government and CSOs. This partnerships must operate 
within a defined national development framework and 
planning. The principles and objectives of the RDP in 
essence reinforce this framework.
There is a need to establish a mechanism for 
partnership with CSOs by Government whose primary 
role should be the funding of CSOs. Other functions to 
this mechanisms should be policy development, 
interacting with Government on development planning 
processes and the facilitation of funding from other 
institutions and Government for CSOs. This 
mechanisms should be a statutory body.
The beneficiary groups of this institution within the 
broad CSO sector were suggested to be the poorest of 
the poor particularly those found in rural areas. The 
problems arising as a result of increased urban 
settlements will have to be addressed by this 
mechanism.
A funding mechanism developed by Government should 
be independent of line ministries and report directly to 
parliament. Reporting to a line ministry would interfere 
with the crosscutting nature of the proposed structure.
Funding for this mechanism, it is argued must come 
from the fiscus in the same manner as the parastatals 
are funded. An alternative to this type of funding could 
be a National State Lottery.
The establishment of the proposed mechanism must 
guard against the duplication of institutional efforts and 
the conflict of interest of specific CSOs.
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PART : 8 ADVISORY COMMITTEE OBSERVATIONS 
AND RECOMMENDATIONS
After a vigorous and careful analysis of information and views
expressed in submission and workshop notes, the Advisory
Committee notes that :
8.1 There is a need for coherence and consistency in Government 
with regard to the role of CSOs in development and ways of 
overcoming constraints facing the CSO sector.
8.2 Funding relationship between CSOs and Government, have 
not been hitherto adequately addressed.
8.3 Funding support to the CSO sector should not be approached 
as a matter of additional state expenditure. Funding of CSOs 
from the fiscus is a means for effectively using development 
resources already allocated as well as way of leveraging the 
resources, energy and ‘own contribution’ of CSOs in the 
delivery of the RDP.
8.4 CSOs are reputed to deliver services at lower cost, contribute 
to the voluntary efforts, mobilize community resources and 
marshall international donor funding in the course of their 
work.
8.5 The establishment of a funding mechanisms and partnership 
with CSOs should not be done in a manner that seeks to 
control government departments and their interaction with 
CSOs. Government departments should continue to develop 
their own relationship with CSOs based on their specific 
needs, programmes and priorities.
8.6 The establishment of a funding mechanism should be 
consistent and enhance the objectives of the RDP whilst 
providing a fast tracking mechanism for the delivery of 
development.
8.7 The mechanism should not seek to;
8.7.1 Control line departments and their interaction with 
CSOs.
8.7.2 Replace current arrangements, including budget
allocations and activities between line departments and 
CSOs.
8.7.3 Replace viable CSO institutions.
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8.7.4 Act as an implementer of development projects.
8.8 In this context a number of options can be pursued by the 
Deputy President and the Cabinet in establishing a structural 
relationship and funding mechanism between CSOs and 
Government which has now come to be referred to as a 
National Development Agency (NDA).
8.9 Transformation of the IDT
An option available is the transformation of the IDT to assume 
a new role. Proponents of this option argue that the IDT 
already has in excess of R1.4billion of state resources. The 
IDT generates through prudent business skills and investment 
policies in excess of R140m per annum. The IDT requires only 
R60m per annum for operating costs. The IDT already 
operates and works closely with certain Government 
departments in the facilitation of development efforts.
The IDT in its submissions, has argued that it desires to play a 
facilitation role. Contrary to its original funding role it 
perceives itself primarily as a development facilitation 
institution15.
Further, the IDT has supported the need for the 
establishment of a dedicated development funding mechanism 
to CSOs. That being the case the IDT did not see itself suited 
to play this role.
Over and above the IDT submissions on their future role, the 
Committee noted the following :
• The importance to separate a funding role from that of 
implementing development. Experiences in South 
Africa and other developing countries prove that 
combining these roles is a recipe for failure, as it 
undermines sound development philosophies.
• The IDT is legally constituted as an independent 
institution from government.
• Government has limited leverage over the affairs of the 
IDT.
• The high level of antagonism between the IDT and 
other progressive CSOs.
15 IDT. 1996. ‘Presentation to the NDA Advisory Committee by the Independent Development 
Trust'. September 1996.
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• The unfair advantage the IDT enjoys over other CSOs 
owing to the fact that they were exclusively financed by 
the previous Government.
• The IDTs’ disproportionate use of consultants as 
against the use of suitably qualified CSOs, and more 
so, the use of historically advantaged consultants.
• The IDTs capacity to implement projects on scale.
• Recent attempts by the IDT to transform itse lf.
In view of the above the Advisory Committee submits that 
further attempts to transform the IDT without the active 
involvement of relevant CSOs and other interested 
stakeholders will serve a very limited purpose. The 
Committee further submits that long drawn processes of 
transformation will act against the survival and interests of 
CSOs which have been battling to survive for the last three 
years. The option of further transforming the IDT to make it 
suitable for the task of funding CSOs would have the effect of 
further delaying the process of finding an immediate solution 
to the current funding problems faced by CSOs and thereby 
exacerbate this crisis. If the experiences of the KT and IDT 
proposed merger and the difficulties experienced in the TNDT 
were anything to go by, CSOs cannot be continually subjected 
to peripheral issues to their survival and performance.
Recommendation :
The Committee accordingly concludes that the IDT should 
continue with its preferred implementation facilitation 
roles and maintain its interface with respective 
Government structures in carrying out projects. In this 
context the IDT could become a Statutory Body 
responsible for government programmes commissioned 
by departments. IDT should further be requested to 
contribute some of its invested capital towards the 
establishment of an institution which will be dedicated 
towards the funding of CSOs.
8.10 Transformation of the TNDT
8.10.1 The TNDT was established by statute in October 1995 
as an interim measure to fund CSOs in crisis as
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government investigated a long-term mechanism to 
relate to CSOs.
Through consultative processes the TNDT was 
established with the support of key stakeholders and 
prospective beneficiaries.
The NEDLAC, NGO Coalition, KT, and IDT 
representatives formed the core body of Trustees of this 
transitional institution. While this arrangement can be 
justified by the then prevailing historical realities, all 
parties represented on the TNDT Board are agreed that 
inclusion of potential grantees on the Board, to decide 
on who may or may not be funded by the TNDT, was a 
fundamental flaw.
The government funded the TNDT to the extent of 
R50m. The European Union contributed R75m to match 
the GNUs contribution.
TNDT has experienced extreme difficulties in the 
conduct of its business. Some of the difficulties include 
conflict of interest among the stakeholders in its 
decision making structures, delays in remittances by the 
government and the EU, staff recruitment difficulties 
and differences in organisation culture between the IDT 
and KT. The latter led to the untimely, withdrawal of 
participation by the IDT in this process.
The setting up processes, structure and focus of the 
TNDT have been singularly problematic. The
appointment of the Trustees based on constituency 
representation, the hope by government for a merger 
between the IDT and the KT could be a source of 
contention among competing stakeholders. The
Committee has noted that anger, negativity and 
despondency exist regarding the TNDT from a wide 
range of CSOs and within the TNDT itself. This was 
borne out, among other things, by the IDT’s untimely 
resignation from the TNDT’s Secretariat. Some of the 
problems are not of the TNDTs making, but are rather 
imputed to it by circumstances beyond its control.
The TNDT has hitherto disbursed no more than R17 M 
by the end of 1996. It is envisaged that the TNDT will 
cease to operate by October 1997 and that a new 
institution will be in place.
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The TNDT has in its submissions supported the 
establishment of a dedicated long-term development 
funding institution of CSOs.
The TNDT has argued in its submissions that the 
funding of CSOs on an emergency basis is both difficult 
and untenable. Only those CSOs that have better 
technical writing skills benefit whilst those in real need 
continue to suffer.
0 The TNDT has offered to assist with the its 
transformation and the establishment of the NDA by 
offering its staff, infrastructure and members of its 
board.
Recommendation :
The Committee submits that whilst transforming the 
TNDT to become the proposed mechanism for 
funding CSOs may be an expedient option, this 
approach is however not viable given the issues 
articulated in the preceding paragraph. It is 
recommended that the TNDT should be phased out 
and all it’s assets transferred to an agreed upon 
mechanism.
Line Ministries and Various Tiers of Government
Line Ministries and Local Government structures could 
be considered for playing the role of funding CSOs.
Annual grant allocations in addition to operating 
expenditures of the programmes of ministries, 
departments and local government could be factored 
into the budget allocations of the ministries.
A Funding Unit and a Development Policy Unit could be 
established in the Ministry of Finance and the office of 
the Deputy President respectively.
Grant allocations through this mechanism should be 
funds over and above tender and any other contractual 
agreements for service delivery.
The need for a fast tracking mechanism and 
interdepartmental cooperation will have to be 
enhanced.
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8.11.5 Structures and mechanisms could also be developed for 
the further allocations to CSOs through local 
governments. Local issues are best dealt with by local 
players. Local government must be encouraged to work 
with CSOs in their localities. This will ensure that the 
capacity for delivery by small grassroot organisations is 
enhanced.
It has, however, been argued that many of the local 
governments have management and capacity problems 
which they are trying to resolve through their current 
change management processes. The same argument 
applies to Ministries and/or departments. It can also be 
argued that such arrangements could lend themselves 
to unsavory political problems. More importantly, a 
strong perception is widely held among various 
stakeholders, that some of these ministries and/or 
departments and tiers of government have hitherto not 
been able to process funds allocated to them through 
the fiscus and current foreign aid programmes, thereby, 
leaving CSOs at risk of closure, and more seriously, 
leaving communities without means of accessing basic 
social services.
Recommendation :
A Funding Unit may be established within the Department of 
Finance, supported by a Development Policy Unit in the office of 
the Deputy President.
The Development Unit is to include both government 
departments and CSO representatives. The Unit will lead in 
determining policy while the Finance Unit will lead in matters 
regarding funding.
THE COMMITTEE ACCORDINGLY NOTES THE FOLLOWING :
The need to support and observe the principles of 
subsidiarity where the decisions, responsibilities and 
capacities should be located at the appropriate tier of 
government.
The unequal levels of competencies amongst the different 
tiers of government and ministries.
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The likely development of patronage relationships 
between specific CSOs and government.
The strong need for CSOs to remain independent and be 
free from manipulation particularly from politicians.
The Committee therefore submits that this option could 
require a measure of intergovernmental cooperation and 
initiative. NEDLAC, CSOs and other stakeholders may of 
necessity be part of the establishment of this process. 
Under the current crisis confronting CSOs this option may 
not yield the immediately desired outcomes regarding the 
sustenance of the CSOs and their mission.
8.12 A New Independent Statutory Body
8.12.1 The option of establishing a new, CSO funding 
dedicated and independent statutory body is strongly 
advocated for by most submissions. The NGO Coalition, 
the CBO network, the IDT, TNDT and workshops by key 
stakeholders have all articulated this position.
8.12.2 The primary function of this institution should be to act 
as a conduit of funding from government to 
development CSOs with ancillary functions in the 
facilitation of development finance from international 
donors, co-ordinating and conducting of development 
policy research, CSO capacity building and maintaining 
a database on CSOs and development funding trends.
8.12.3 It is recommended that the beneficiaries of this body 
should be CSOs providing development services to 
vulnerable communities and social groupings particular­
ly rural communities and those communities beset by 
problems related to the new and fast growing urban 
settlements.
8.12.4 The objectives of this institutions should be the 
improvement of the living conditions of the poorest 
people in South Africa whilst enhancing their capacity 
to control their daily lives .
8.12.5 The goals of this institution should be to give the poor 
greater influence over development at local, provincial 
and national levels, the meeting of basic needs, 
fostering gender equality advancing the sustainable use 
of natural resources, the promotion of constitutional and
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human rights and the promotion of strategies that 
increase incomes and the participation of the poor in 
the economy.
8.12.6 The operating values and principles of this institution 
should be transparency, accountability, institutional 
autonomy, accessibility and availability, a high quality 
of service to its clients, impartiality, gender and race 
equality and generally the observance of the RDP 
principles.
8.12.7 This institution is to report to parliament and should not 
be part of a government department, ministry and/or 
their programmes.
8.12.8 The funding of this structure should be through annual 
fiscal allocations or a National State Lottery.
8.12.9 A governing board appointed through public hearings 
and/or by public nominations. This Board should have 
the latitude and authority to elaborate the details of this 
structure including the appointment of the Chief 
Executive.
8.12.10 The governing board should not include nominees who 
are likely to have a direct interest or benefit from this 
institution. It should include the selection of certain key 
government or ministerial representatives.
The Committee strongly recommends this option to the 
Deputy President and Cabinet on the basis that:
• It is likely to fast track the delivery of 
development initiatives owing to the fact that it 
shall be dedicated to the sector.
• It is unlikely to be caught up in the conflict often 
experienced by institutions that act both as 
implementers and funders of development 
activity.
• It is unlikely to be confused with and /or 
burdened with inheriting problems , miss 
perceptions and animosities faced by the current 
operating mechanisms such as the IDT and the 
TNDT.
• It opts for lessened political and or ministerial 
interference and calls for a high level of
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accountability and focus the prospective
beneficiaries.
• It has the potential for a reduced level of 
bureaucracy and ministerial red tapes and can be 
operated at the provincial and or local levels.
• It can be put in place by using current ministerial
and departmental RDP budget savings, TNDTs 
non expenditures and savings as well as the 
possibility of recalling IDT unallocated
investments.
• It has been widely advocated for by all key 
stakeholders..
8.13 With respect to the transformation of the IDT the Committee 
notes over and above the IDTs submissions,
• the desirability to separate a funding role from that of 
development implementation, the latter being what the 
IDT is geared to play.
• the IDT is legally constituted as an independent 
institution form government. Government has limited 
leverage over the affairs of the IDT other than a moral 
and /or political clout.
• the unfair advantage that the IDT is perceived to enjoy 
over other development CSOs and the resultant 
antagonism that arise from a large body of the sector 
including the antagonism about the disproportionate 
use by the IDT of consultants particularly those from a 
historically disadvantaged, under-privileged back­
ground.
• The IDTs capacity to implement projects with 
government departments on scale.
• The recent serious attempts and discussions with 
government by the IDT to transform itself.
8.14 The Committee is of the view that the transformation of the 
IDT into an NDA is likely to require a new process to consult 
with all stakeholders including the involvement of NEDLAC 
and other players. This is likely to delay the implementation 
of the envisaged institution and continue to frustrate CSOs.
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More importantly government may be perceived to be 
interfering with the plans of an independent institution.
8.15 The Committee is of the view that the establishment of this 
institution must be funded on the basis of a progressive scale. 
A framework for the operationalisation of this structure is 
included as Annexure 4 to this report.
8.16 The Committee is of the view that the funding of CSOs 
through government ministries and local government over and 
above contractual and/or programmatic relationships that exist 
might compromise the need for fast tracking and implementing 
the RDP as already exemplified in current expenditure 
logjams.
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PART : 9 MANAGING THE TRANSITION
9.1 A priority is to clarify the relationship between the proposed 
NDA and the TNDT. The TNDT was established by 
government as an interim measure to afford the government 
the space and opportunity to properly take stock of the 
development funding arena and make a decision as to the 
most appropriate role for itself in supporting the development 
sector. This relationship is potentially problematic if it is not 
managed in an open, transparent and up-front manner. At the 
moment conditions are favorable since the TNDT’s mandate of 
two years is clearly understood by all stakeholders. Secondly, 
the staff of the TNDT are also fully aware of this and senior 
staff expressed that they would not like to continue beyond the 
two years. Thirdly, there seems to be agreement that the 
comparative strengths of the TNDT and their experience be 
harnessed to inform the operations and systems of the NDA.
9.2 This is also important because an NDA would be paralysed if 
it starts up by having to contend with awkward pressures 
(exerted by particular interests) to have a predetermined 
status and role in the new agency. The challenge is to find the 
balance between the benefits of a completely new institution 
with a clean slate, and building on the available resources, 
knowledge and infrastructure of institutions such as the TNDT 
that the government has supported. In seeking this balance it 
will be important to remain vigilant of legalities, and to avoid 
any decisions or impressions that may compromise the ability 
of the new agency to stamp a unique and different identity on 
the organisation. Undue residue of other organisational 
dynamics, be it the TNDT, IDT or any other candidate for 
‘infrastructure borrowing’, must be avoided to keep transitional 
processes smooth and focused.
9.3 This said, it is obviously critical to ensure that the new agency
is established with cost-effectiveness as a modis operandi. 
Since the TNDT’s mandate will expire at a given date, there is 
an obvious case to be made for transferring its assets and 
resources to an NDA. However, this need to be
conceptualised and designed in a manner that takes account 
of the need for a new and separate process to inform the 
establishment of the NDA. A detailed inventory of the asset 
base, liabilities, and other resources of the TNDT will have to 
be compiled towards the end of the TNDT’s life-span. The 
Committee envisages that the winding-up phase of the TNDT 
could be lengthy and it may be appropriate for an accounting 
firm to oversee the process. This should not influence the 
establishment and operations of the NDA. In the very early
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phases of establishing basic systems and procedures the staff 
of the TNDT may be involved on short-term contracts to 
expedite these issues. This can be done without creating 
expectation of an automatic tenure in the new body.
9.4 Once the recommendations of this report has been endorsed 
and adopted as government policy, it will be necessary to draft 
a transition steps policy document that will consider issues 
regarding the capitalisation required for the establishment of 
an NDA, the potential for building on existing resources within 
the TNDT and the IDT, and any other organisations that may 
appropriate.
9.5 Considering the institutional density and complexity in the 
development sphere, it is important to have a powerful and 
committed driver of the transition process. This is related to 
two other reasons;
I. due to the departmentally organised nature of government, 
projects which are meant to cut across line ministries can 
easily fall into a vacuum characterised by a lack of 
resources and profile that could be fatal to the initiative 
before it has had a chance;
II. and, in view of the different processes that will have to 
unfold simultaneously, it will be a critical success factor to 
have a well resourced, empowered and status-endowed 
person/office to champion the establishment of the agency 
with an aura of enthusiasm and expectation. For these 
reasons and for the sake of continuity the Advisory 
Committee proposes that this role continue to be housed in 
the Office of the Deputy Executive President.
9.6 Once the governing body has been appointed, their first order 
of business must be to execute a process to develop a 
detailed strategic plan for the NDA. This should include, inter 
alia;
• the formulation of a specific purpose (mission) for the 
new organisation in terms of the founding objectives 
and guiding principles elaborated earlier (10.2). The 
mission should be consistent with the primary purpose 
as set out in this report and the objects of the 
envisaged enabling act;
• a limited number of strategic objectives to guide the 
organisational plans towards fulfilling its primary 
purpose;
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• defining concrete targets in terms of the each strategic 
objective in five year, three year, and annual formats to 
enable the establishment of a clear and transparent 
monitoring and evaluation system within the new 
agency.
9.7 A critical element for a successful transition process will be a 
good communications strategy. (See Annexure 4 for an 
overview of the different steps involved in establishing an 
NDA.) Development donors and facilitators are often 
subjected to controversy and to accusations of not living up to 
expectations. This legacy can be circumvented if the 
organisation factors strategic communication actions into 
every step of the transition process, and especially in the first 
few months in the life of the organisation. Such a strategy will 
have to target the public, NGOs, CBOs, government 
departments, corporate and foreign donors, etc. in 
differentiated ways to ensure that the right’ message gets 
through.
9.8 Considering the scale of the operation to establish an NDA 
and the delicate political issues that will have to be managed 
along the way, it will be critical to ensure that the preparatory 
processes are thoroughly designed and adequately resourced.
The success or failure of the NDA will in a large measure 
depend on the quality and depth of the planning and 
preparation work that will be invested into its inception. An 
Annexure to this report provides an overview of the critical 
steps that will have to be followed towards establishing the 
NDA (Annexure 4). Resources will have to accessed to 
ensure that it unfolds smoothly.
41
10. CONCLUDING STATEMENT
The Committee has been privileged to advise the Deputy 
President and Cabinet on an issue which is fundamental to the 
reconstruction and development goals of the people of South 
Africa, and to the eradication of the legacy of apartheid. We 
hope that our labour will contribute to the continued 
improvement of the development framework. Certainly, if the 
outcome is not only the creation of the NDA, but also the 
infusion of a new dynamism into the thinking of civil society 
and government, both about the imperatives of sustainable 
development and relations between them, the Committee will 
be satisfied; but not content. Too much remains to be done to 
bring reconstruction and development to the people for 
anyone in South Africa today to rest content.
THUS SUBMITTED AND SIGNED BY PHUMZILE MLAMBO- 
NGCUKA, DEPUTY MINISTER, DEPARTMENT OF TRADE AND 
INDUSTRY, ON BEHALF OF THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE, ON 
THIS NINETEENTH DAY OF FEBRUARY 1997.
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ANNEXURE 1.
THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE SET UP TO 
INVESTIGATE AND ADVISE THE DEPUTY 
PRESIDENT AND CABINET ON 
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS SUPPORTING  
STRUCTURAL RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN  
GOVERNMENT AND CIVIL SOCIETY  
ORGANISATIONS
Prepared for the Deputy President The Honorable Mr Thabo Mbeki
TERMS OF REFERENCE
1. BACKGROUND
The rationalisation and re-organisation of delivery and funding 
mechanisms has been part of a discussion in Cabinet since 1994. The 
specific task of effecting the necessary changes were allocated to the 
RDP Ministry. After lengthy discussions and negotiations lasting over 
a year two interlinked steps were set in motion by the Ministry.
The one was the establishment of an agency that would respond to 
the immediate needs of Non governmental development organisations. 
The Transitional National Development Trust (TNDT) was launched in 
1995 to perform this function.
The second step was a process that would lead to the establishment a 
more long term institutional arrangement, the National Development 
Agency (NDA). This process entailed setting up an Advisory 
Committee which would advise the Minister and Cabinet on the nature, 
functioning and resourcing of this agency.
These two processes were endorsed by the Cabinet in 1995 and R50 
million was allocated to the TNDT with the understanding that 
European Union would make a further contribution of R75million.
1.2 APPOINTMENT OF THE NDA COMMITTEE
Prior to the reshuffle of Cabinet in March 1996, The Minister in the 
office of the President set up the Advisory Committee of 17 members, 
to be chaired by Ms. P. Mlambo-Ngcuka. The Committee was to 
make recommendations and advise the Minister and Cabinet on the 
establishment of the National Development Agency (NDA).
Members of the Committee were drawn from the following sectors: 
The Ecumenical movement, NGO/CBO/other Developmental voluntary 
Associations, Labour, Business, Community Constituency, Research 
and Social Policy analysts, Human Rights Community, Welfare 
Institutions, Development Funding bodies and International 
Development Agencies.
It is, however, essential to point out that committee members do not 
represent their specific constituency interests. The members were all 
appointed by the Minister on the basis of their expertise and 
commitment on matters that are relevant to a NDA.
1.3 IMPACT OF CABINET RESHUFFLE ON THE PROCESS
In the light of the shifts in Cabinet, the Office of the Deputy President 
was given the responsibility to provide leadership and support to the 
NDA process. Subsequently, the NDA Advisory Committee was 
endorsed by Cabinet in July 1996.
2. THE ROLE OF A NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT AGENCY
The GNU acknowledges the role of civil society outside of business 
corporates in carrying out the objectives of the RDP. It also
acknowledges that Civil Society Organisations often have direct links 
with grassroots communities. These links give them the necessary 
insight and equip them with skills to deal with socio-economic 
problems within communities and to engage significantly in poverty 
alleviation programmes.
The Government further recognises that it is in its own interest and in 
the interest of the disadvantaged that an enabling policy environment 
should be created for Civil Society Organisations. This environment 
would enable civil society to continue to contribute towards 
development processes and good governance.
Government and Civil Society Organisations have come to terms with 
the reality that there is a need to find means to interact with and 
support autonomous organisations outside government who are 
involved in development processes.
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The idea of setting up an institution to enhance this partnership has 
been widely supported and the proposed institution would be charged 
with the responsibility to:
Focus minds and energies of development practitioners on ways and
means of meeting the needs of the poor
Facilitate the promotion of all development activities
Ensure that the country's resources are deployed in the most efficient, 
effective and co-ordinated manner
Encourage and support good development practices within 
communities.
Promote sustainable partnerships between government and Civil 
Society.
To this end the Minister in the Office of the President had acted as a 
catalyst to bring about the formation of Transitional National 
Development Trust (TNDT). The TNDT, an independent transitional 
body, has a specific brief, namely, to respond to the immediate 
development needs of civil society organisations.
3. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE’S TERMS OF REFERENCE
The Advisory Committee shall make recommendations to the Cabinet 
and the Deputy State President on the following:
(i) The appropriate and functional relationship between 
Government and Organs of Civil Society with respect to the 
provision of capacity for the implementation of the RDP.
(ii) The structure and precise functions of a National Development 
Agency.
The final decision on the matter will rest with the Cabinet and the 
Deputy State President.
In carrying out its mandate the Advisory Committee shall take the 
following into account:
• Work done by the study into an Enabling Environment, noting 
the Draft Proposal for the Non-Profit Legislation.
• The existence of different types of Civil Society Organisations 
(NGOs and CBOs and other voluntary associations) and their 
comparative advantages in terms of the value they add to 
development processes
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• The impact of Government tendering processes and 
contractual relationships on different types of organisations
• Past and future impact of Civil Society Organisations in the 
delivery of the RDP with special reference to poverty, 
unemployment, rural development and socio-economic 
empowerment of the historically disadvantaged groups and 
communities.
• Existing development funding institutions and their roles
• Recent studies on Civil Society Organisations
• Monitoring of the value added by civil society organisations to 
the development process
and make recommendations to the Deputy President and
Cabinet concerning:
1. Role of the National Development Agency (NDA).
2. Institutional arrangements for the NDA :
® Structure
• Legal Status
• Relationship to Government
• Relationship to other existing Development Institutions
3. Financial relationships between government and Civil Society 
Organisations
4. Management of the transition i.e. from existing institutional 
arrangements to the NDA
• Implication of the NDA in relation to existing funding 
development agencies
• phasing out the TNDT and incorporating its experiences and 
integrating its work.
The options to be provided by the Committee have to be workable and will be 
regarded as recommendations.
3.1 PARTICIPATION OF SOCIAL PARTNERS
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NEDLAC Development Chamber and Management Committee have 
supported the Minister’s proposal to set up the Advisory Committee.
The Committee is expected to work closely with the NEDLAC 
Development Chamber. This will ensure constituency support for the 
process.
3.2 TIME FRAMES
The Advisory Committee shall be required to report to the 
Deputy President by November 1996.
4. CONSULTATIONS
The Advisory Committee is required to consult as broadly as possible 
within the time constraints. Consultation should cover all stakeholders 
including Business, Civil Society, The Donor Community, Labour, and 
various levels of Government as well as line departments.
5. REMUNERATION
The Committee will be remunerated in accordance with Treasury 
Instruction T4.2 (a) (ii) as amended and will comply to all the 
requirements of the Treasury Instruction Chapter T.
6. ORGANISATIONAL AND PERSONNEL IMPLICATIONS
The Advisory Committee will be supported by the NGO Liaison Office. 
In addition to the present staff of the NGO Liaison office, a full time 
Administrative Secretary may be appointed for the duration of the 
process.
7. FINANCIAL IMPLICATIONS
The process shall be supported from the Budget of the 
Deputy Presidents.
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ANNEXURE 2.
ADVISORY C O M M ITTEE M EM BER S
N A M E O R G A N ISA T IO N  AND D E SIG N A T IO N
Chairperson :
PHUMZILE MLAMBO-NGCUKA Deputy Minister, Department of Trade and Industry
Vice-Chairperson 
GRIFFITHS ZABALA Consultant - Human Resource Development
JEFF RADEBE Minister. Department of Public Works
RAMS RAMASHIA President. National NGO Coalition
MERCIA ANDREWS Deputy Director, Trust for Christian Outreach and Education
YASMIN SOOKA Commissioner. Truth and Reconciliation Commission
ROSE SEPTEMBER Researcher - Institute of Child and Family Development 
Senior Executive. Welfare Forum
RANDALL HOW.ARD Senior Executive. COSATU (NEDLAC Nominee)
PIETER HAASBROEK Group Economist. Barlows Limited (NEDLAC Nominee)
HYLTON APPELBAUM Executive Trustee. Liberty Life Foundation
SHIRLEY MOULDER Africa Director. ASHOKA
JOHAN BRISMAN Minister of Development. Swedish International Development Cooperation 
Agency (Sida)
LISEBO KHOALI-MC CARTHY Executive Director. Nauonal Rural Development Fonim (NEDLAC Nominee)
FAAROOQ MANGERA Senior Programme Officer. USAID
DAVID WHALEY Resident Representauve. UNDP
BONGANI MORE Director. Department of Public Works
SARGHOONA GORDHAN Director. Department of Welfare
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S U B M IS SIO N T IT L E A U T H O R S U B M IT ­
T E D
Alzheimer’s & Related Disorders 
Assoc (ARDA)
Kathy Beukes - Natl 
Director
6.11.96
Brits Training & Entrepreneur 
Centre (B TEC)
Consultation with NGOs/CBOs on Relations 
between the Govt & Organs of Civil Society
Mrs A Jonker - Head of 
Training
13.11.96
Community Chest Allocation Dept, 
Cape Town
Submission with regard to the relationship 
between Govt & the NGO/CBO Community
Amelia Jone - CEO 08.11.96
Disabled People South Africa Position & Input Paper, NGO/CBO 
Relationship with Govt
Embalenhle Housing Association Consultation with NGOs/CBOs on relations 
between Govt & Organs of Civil Society
Alex Persent - Housing 
Co-ordinator
08.11.96
Foundation for Contemporary 
Research (FCT)
Ginny Volbrecht- 
Researcher
08.11.96
Gauteng Peace & Development 
Foundation
Submission on the relationship between Govt 
and NGOs
Cathy Bean/Mavis 
Cook
13.11.96
Institute of Natural Resources Jane Zimmermann 07.11.96
Johannesburg Child Welfare 
Society
Consultation with NGOs/CBOs on relations 
between the Govt & Organs of Civil Society
Jackie Loffell - 
Advocacy Coordinator
08.11.96
National Land Committee National Development Agency & 
Relationship between Civil Society & Govt
Rebecca Roderick - 
NLC Treasurer
14.11.96
SA Prisoners Organisation for 
Human Rights
Human. Material & Financial Assistance G Miles Bhudu, 
President
06.11.96
Surplus People Project Nov 96
South Cape Land Committee 
(SCLC)
Govt Financial & Institutional Support to 
NGOs
The National Council for Persons 
with Physical Disabilities in 
S Africa
Consultation workshops Hettie Marais - Asst 
Director, Welfare
14.11.96
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SU B M ISS IO N T IT L E A U T H O R SU B M IT -
ED
Dept Health & Welfare Draft Paper on the Relationship between 
the Dept o f Health and the NGO/CBO 
Sector in SA
Dr Yogan Pillay 21.11.96
The Independent Development 
Trust (IDT)
Presentation to the NDA Advisory 
Committee
Sept 96
Independent Mediation Service 
o f SA  (IM SSA )
Report on the NDA Advisory Committee 
Provincial Consultative Process covering 
all nine provinces
25.11.96
National NGO Coalition Submission to the NDA Advisorv 
Committee
Sept 96
National Rural Development 
Forum (NRDF)
Submission on first draft o f report Lisebo Khoali- 
McCarthy
19 11.96
Transitional National 
Development Trust (TNDT)
Submission to the NDA Advisorv 
Committee
Sept 96
Department o f Welfare Submission to the NDA Advisorv 
Committee
18.11.96
University o f the W Cape Welfare Funding 9 Oct 96
ANNEXURE4
TIME FRAME FOR OPERATIONALISING THE NDA
1 Step Activity/Milestones : Responsible Time-Frame
1. Report submitted to Cabinet and 
recommendations are approved
DP’s Office March 1997
2. Legislation is prepared to be tabled in 
parliament during the second session
DP’s Office. 2 months, ready by 
May 1997.
3. Legislation is tabled and approved DP's Office Finalised by June 
1997
4. All preparatory work is conceptualised and 
planned in a transition steps document.
NGO Liaison 
Unit
Work commence in 
March 1997 & final 
report: June 1997.
5. Nomination Process for Governing Board NGO Liaison 
Unit
August - September 
1997
6. Public Interviews & Appointment of 
Governing Board
NGO Liaison 
Unit
October - November 
1997
7. Strategic Planning of Governing Board NGO Liaison 
Unite
1 Week in December 
1997
8. Advertise for CEO and senior management 
for NDA
NGO Liaison 
Unit
Mid-December 1997
9. Interview & Appoint CEO and senior 
management for NDA
NGO Liaison 
Unit
Mid-end of January 
1998
10. Preparatory workshop between Board, CEO 
and senior managers to plan 
operationalisation
NGO Liaison 
Unit
February 1998
11. Design of Funding Mechanisms, Systems, 
Information Technology, Communication 
strategy, Staffing Policies, etc.*
NGO Liaison 
Unit
March 1998
12. Advertise and Recruit Project and Field 
Staff
NGO Liaison 
Unit/DP’s Office
March 1998
13. Training of Staff in systems; this should 
include placement programmes with other 
agencies and dummy runs to pick up as 
many problems in the system as possible.
NGO Liaison 
Unit/ DP’s 
Office
May - June 1998
14. Open doors to public NDA Governing 
Board
July 1998.T
It is necessary that a special funding systems advisory group be established to conceptualise and plan around 
systems design issues. Such a group could be comprised of a number of donor organisation representatives that 
come together and feed their experience and expertise into the process. They could potentially also fund such a 
process and especially arrange for placement programmes within their organisations once the management and 
field staff have been employed.
L Considering the time it will take to prepare and organise the establishment of the NDA it will be critical to 
ensure that the public and especially potential beneficiary organisations are informed about the different stages 
and the process be conceptualised as actually starting as soon as March 1997!
LIST OF ACRONYMS
A C ................................................. Advisory Committee
A N C ............................................. African National Congress
C L O ............................................. Community Liaison Officer
C S O ...............................................Civil Society Organisations
D P ..............................................  Deputy President
E U .................................................European Union
G N U ............................................. Government of National Unity
ID T ............................................... Independent Development Trust
K T .................................................Kagiso Trust
N D A ...............................................National Development Agency
N E D LA C ...................................... National Economic Development & Labour Council
N G O ...............................................Non-government Organisation
P A C T .............................................Private Agencies Collaborating Together
P V O ............................................... Private Voluntary Organisations
R D P ................................................Reconstruction & Development Programme
S A C B C ..........................................South African Catholic Bishops Conference
S A C C ............................................. South African Council of Churches
S ID A ...............................................Swedish International Development & Cooperation Agency
T E F S A ........................................... Trust for Education Fund for South Africa
U N ...................................................United Nations
U N D P............................................. United Nations Development Programme
U N FPA ...........................................United Nations Fund for Population Development
U N H C R ......................................... United Nations High Commission for Refugees
U N IC E F .........................................United Nations Children’s Fund
U SA ID ............................................United States Aid
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